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This paper explores the decomposition of equilibrium unemployment into involuntary
and frictional components using a model that combines efficiency wages with search and
matching frictions in the labour market. In deriving our results we generalise the celebrated
Solow Condition, expressing the wage as the sum of a pure efficiency wage component and
a component that reflects search frictions. Using standard values of calibrated parameters,
we find that the bulk of unemployment is involuntary.
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1 Introduction
Economists distinguish two main types of unemployment. The first is frictional unemploy-
ment, reflecting search and matching frictions in the labour market (e.g. Pissarides, 2000). The
second is involuntary unemployment, typically explained by invoking either efficiency wage ef-
fects or union-firm bargaining. These have different causes: frictional unemployment is rooted
in the imperfect matching between unemployed workers and available vacancies that is charac-
teristic of large, dispersed economies, whereas involuntary unemployment is centered around
wage determination and associated issues of bargaining power and worker motivation. They
also imply different policy responses: frictional unemployment can be addressed by improving
information about available opportunities and by re-training workers to make them better suited
for available vacancies, while involuntary unemployment can be addressed by reforming wage
determination and the unemployment compensation system. Although frictional and involun-
tary unemployment have both been analysed extensively, the issue of their relative importance
in explaining observed unemployment has not been explored in as much depth. This is an im-
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portant issue for economists and policymakers: if frictional unemployment is a more important
determinant of the unemployment rate, then economists can focus more on understanding the
forces that give rise to it and policymakers can place more emphasis on mitigating its effects.
In this paper, we analyse the relative size of frictional and involuntary unemployment in
steady-state. In order to analyse involuntary unemployment, we need an explicit model of wage
determination. We do this by incorporating a generic representation of efficiency wage effects
due to Solow (1979) into a simple DSGE model with labour market search frictions. Using
this model, we decompose steady-state unemployment into two components, the first due to
involuntary unemployment and the other reflecting frictional unemployment. Calibrating our
model using parameter values popular in the literature, we find that the majority of state-state
unemployment can be classified as being involuntary. This benchmark value suggests that a
policy focus on the root causes of involuntary unemployment might be a priority.
Our analysis is grounded in the search frictions models developed by Diamond (1982),
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2017, for
a more recent contribution), extended to include DSGE features by, for example, Krause and
Lubik (2007) and Blanchard and Gali (2010). Michaillat (2012) analyses a model in which
frictional and involuntary unemployment co-exist; he uses a pure search frictions model based
on a bargaining approach to wage determination with real wage rigidity, rather than an efficiency
wage model, to construct time series for frictional and involuntary unemployment. Malcomson
and Mavroeidis (2007) analyse the relative sizes of frictional and involuntary unemployment
using a different type of efficiency wage effect, the shirking model developed by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) but do not quantify the relative size of the two types.
The paper is structured as follows. We outline our model in section 2) and characterise
optimal wage-setting by the firm. The wage is the sum of two components; the first due to
efficiency wage effects and the second reflecting labour market frictions. Labour market fric-
tions increase the wage. Intuitively, this is because output depends on effective labour input,
the product of employment and effort per worker. An increase in hiring costs induces firms
to adjust the composition of effective labour, increasing effort relative to employment. This is
achieved through an increase in the wage. We analyse the aggregate steady-state unemploy-
ment rate in section 3) and show how it can be decomposed into involuntary and frictional
components. Section 4) presents a calibration of our model. Using standard values from the
search-and-matching and efficiency wage literatures to calibrate our structural parameters, we
show that the large majority of steady-state unemployment in our model is involuntary. Section
5) summarises and concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we analyse wage and employment determination, drawing on a DSGE model
with search frictions in the labour market. For brevity and clarity, we do not outline all as-
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pects of the model. Our analysis is based on a discrete time model of undirected search with
identical workers and firms. Following the literature on search frictions, as summarised in Pis-
sarides (2000), we assume that a worker inelastically supplies labour and is either employed or
unemployed. If employed, they receive the wage; if unemployed, they receive unemployment
benefits. We depart from the standard search frictions literature in two respects. We assume that
the wage is posted by the firm rather than determined through wage bargaining. We also assume
that output depends on the amount of effort expended by the worker. The worker chooses effort
to balance, at the margin, two offsetting effects: a dislike of exerting effort and a reciprocity
effect through which the worker derives utility from responding to a generous wage offer from
the firm by increasing effort, or from ”punishing” a low wage offer from the firm by reducing
effort; evidence for the reciprocity effect includes Kahneman et al (1986), Bewley (1999) and
Fehr et al (2009).
To formalise effort determination, we assume the worker has a disutility of exerting
effort given by c(et), where e is effort, and follow Rabin (1993) and Danthine and Kurmann
(2007) by assuming that the utility from reciprocity is given by R(et,Wt, W¯t) = g(Wt, W¯t)d(et)
where W is the wage and W¯t is a reference wage. The worker chooses effort to minimise c(et)-
R(et,Wt, W¯t). The optimal level of effort is therefore characterised by ce(et) = de(et)g(Wt, W¯t).
Solving this for effort, we obtain the optimal supply of effort function as
eit = e(Wit, W¯t) (1)
We assume that output at representative firm i at time t depends on employment and effort
expended by workers
Yit = AtF(eitNit) (2)
where N is employment, At is technology, given by At = Aezt , where zt is a productivity shock
and we assume F′(.) > 0 and F′′(.) ≤ 0. Employment evolves according to
Nit = (1 − τ)Nit−1 + hit (3)
where h is the number of workers hired and τ is the exogenous job separation rate. The labour
market is characterised by search frictions and so firms must post vacancies in order to hire
workers. We assume the aggregate matching function is ht = M(Ut,Vt) where h are aggregate
hires, U is the number of job seekers and V are aggregate vacancies; we assume MU(.) > 0,
MV (.) > 0, MUU(.) ≤ 0 and MVV (.) ≤ 0. We also assume the matching function has constant
returns to scale, so ht = Vt M( UtVt , 1), hence the vacancy filling rate qt is given by qt =
ht
Vt
=
M¯( UtVt ), where M¯(
U
V ) = M(
U
V , 1)
1. We further assume that the number of workers hired by firm
1These assumptions are satisfied by the widely using matching function ht = mUαt U
1−α
t
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i is proportional to the relative number of vacancies it posts, so hit = VitVt ht, where Vit is the
number of vacancies posted by the firm. As a result, qit = hitVit = qt and so the vacancy filling rate
is exogenous at the level of firm. Firms are monopolistic competitors with demand function
Yit
Yt
= (
Pit
Pt
)− (4)
where Pit is the price set by firm, Yt is aggregate output and Pt is the aggregate price2. We
follow the literature on search frictions in assuming the unit cost of a vacancy is γt = γ¯At.
Per-period profit for firm i is
piit = PitYit −WitNit − γtVit (5)
In an efficiency wage context, the firm chooses employment and the wage. The value
function for the firm is then
V(Nit−1) = max{Wit , Nit}
{piit + βtEtV(Nit)} (6)
where βt is the stochastic discount factor, since Nit−1 is a state variable in period t. Effort is not
observed by the firm, but the firm knows the effort function in (1). Using (1)-(4) the first-order
condition for the wage is
Pit
µ
AtF′(.)e′(Wit) = 1 (7)
where µ = 
−1 is the mark-up of price over marginal cost. The first-order condition for employ-
ment is
Pit
µ
AtF′(.)eit = Wit + γ¯
At
qit
− βtγ¯(1 − τ)Et At+1qit+1 (8)
where the RHS of (8) is the present value of the marginal cost of a new hire, composed of the
wage plus the present value of hiring costs, the cost of hiring an additional worker in the current
period less the expected present value of the reduction in future hiring costs implied by this
hire3.
These imply an extension to the Solow Condition, given by
Wite′(Wit)
eit
=
1
1 + γ¯Wit (
At
qit
− βt(1 − τ)Et At+1qit+1 )
(9)
2This is a standard relationship in DSGE models, where Yt = {
∫ 1
0 Y
ε−1

jt d}
ε
−1 and Pt = {
∫ 1
0 P
1−ε
jt d}
1
1−ε ,
where is the elasticuty of substitution between different goods in consumption; see, eg Miao ( 2014)
3This is the standard optimality condition for firms in this type of model (eg Miao, 2014, chapter 18),
extended to allow for effort effects.
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At the optimum, the elasticity of effort w.r.t the wage equals the ratio of the wage to the present
value of the cost of a new hire. In the absence of labour market frictions, this simplifies to the
original Solow condition.
To proceed, we assume that c(et) =
ωe1+ϕt
1+ϕ , d(et) =
κe1+χt
1+χ and g(wt) = (
Wit−W¯t
W¯t
). The
optimal supply of effort is then
e(Wit, W¯t) = e¯(
Wit − W¯t
W¯t
)σ (10)
where σ = 1
ϕ−χ . This corresponds to the effort function assumed by Summers (1988). Combin-
ing this with (7) and (8), the optimal wage is obtained as
Wit =
1
1 − σW¯t +
σ
1 − σγ¯(
At
qit
− βt(1 − τ)Et At+1qit+1 ) (11)
The wage has two distinct components. The first is a pure efficiency wage effect in which the
wage is a mark-up over the reference wage, where the mark-up reflects the strength of efficiency
wages. The second reflects labour market frictions as the worker receives a proportion of the
present value of hiring costs, where this proportion also reflects the strength of efficiency wage
effects. The impact of hiring costs on wages arises from the fact that firms determine both the
size and the composition of effective labour input (eitNit). In response to an increase in hiring
costs, firms increase effort relative to employment, achieving this through an increase in the
wage.
3 Equilibrium Unemployment
To analyse unemployment we aggregate the firm-level relationships derived above and consider
steady-state outcomes. In order to obtain an explicit solution, we assume that the matching
function is M(Ut,Vt) = mUαt V
1−α
t . Using h = τN, the vacancy filling rate is a function of
unemployment: q(U) = m( mU
τ(1−U) )
α
1−α . We also assume F(eitNit) = eitNit and that the reference
wage is (e.g. Summers, 1988)
W¯t = (1 − φUt)Wat (12)
where Wat is the wage offered by other firms and φ measures the importance of unemployment
in determining a worker’s outside opportunity (φ > 0). At the aggregate level, effort is also a
function of unemployment: e(U) = e¯( φU1−φU )
σ. Imposing the equilibrium conditions Wit = Wat =
Wt and Pit = Pt, the first-order conditions for the wage and employment become
σ
µ
PAe(U)
φU
= W (13)
and
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1
µ
PAe(U) = W + γ¯
A(1 − β(1 − τ))
q(U)
(14)
Solving, we obtain
e(U)q(U)(1 − σ
φU
) = µγˆ (15)
where γˆ = (1 − β(1 − τ)) γP is the present value of marginal hiring costs. Defining Uew = σφ , the
steady-state unemployment rate is given by
e(U)q(U)(1 − U
ew
U
) = µγˆ (16)
In the absence of labour market frictions (γˆ = 0), this simplifies to U = Uew, the unemployment
rate implied by a pure efficiency wage model. If there are labour market frictions, U > Uew,
giving an additional component to unemployment. Since e(U) and q(U) are increasing func-
tions, the unemployment rate is an increasing function of the mark-up (µ), the responsiveness
of effort to the wage (σ), the separation rate (τ), vacancy costs (γ); and a decreasing function of
the efficiency of job matching (m) and the weight on unemployment in the reference wage (φ).
Decomposing unemployment as
U = Uew + U f r (17)
where U f r is the frictional component, (16) implies that
U f r = λ(U)U (18)
where λ(U) = µγˆe(U)q(U) and
Uew = (1 − λ(U))U (19)
4 Calibration
In this section, we investigate the relative sizes of the components of equilibrium unemployment
using a calibration of the model. We calibrate the structural parameters of our model using
widely used values in the existing literature and consider a quarterly frequency. We follow
Shimer (2005) in setting the discount factor at β = 0.988, the elasticity of hires with respect to
unemployment at α = 0.72 and the efficiency of the matching function as m = 1.355. We also
follow Shimer in setting the cost of posting a vacancy as γ = 0.213; this value lies in the range
of calibrated values of γ in the literature4. In the literature, monthly values of the separation
4The value of γ is contentious. Shimer (2005) uses a quarterly vacancy cost of 0.213. Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) use a weekly vacancy cost of 0.584. Hall (2005) assumes a monthly cost of 0.986
while Pissarides (2009) assumes 0.356.
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rate vary between 0.03 (Hall and Milgrom, 2008) and 0.036 (Pissarides, 2009); our choice of
τ = 0.12 lies within this range and is also used by Gali (2011)5. We use a price mark-up of
µ = 1.2; this is a standard value in the New Keynesian literature. In calibrating the effects
of endogenous effort, we draw on the estimates of an effort function analogous to (10) in Della
Vigna and Pope (2016); we calibrate σ = 0.025, which is towards the lower end of the estimates
in that paper. We use φ = 0.53; this implies that unemployment compensation is 54% of wage
income. This is between the values of 0.4 assumed by Shimer (2005) and 0.71 assumed by Hall
and Milgrom (2008) and is within the range of 0.47 − 0.96 estimated by Chodorow-Reich and
Karabarounis (2016) based on alternative specifications of the flow value of non-work. Table
1) summarises our calibrated values.
Table 1. Calibration Parameters
β α m γ¯ τ µ σ φ e¯
0.988 0.720 1.355 0.213 0.120 1.200 0.025 0.530 0.700
These values impy a steady-state unemployment rate of 5.37%; this is close to the post-
war average US unemployment rate. They also imply an equilibrium job finding rate of 68%,
which is also close to the observed value in the US. The implied values of unemployment using
the parameter values in Table 1) are presented in the first row of Table 2). The involuntary
component of steady-state unemployment is Uew = 4.72% and the frictional component is
U f r = 0.65%. Thus λ = 0.122, implying that roughly 12% of total unemployment in steady-
state is frictional. This suggests that most unemployment in steady-state is due to the factors
that drive involuntary unemployment, wage determination and the unemployment compensation
system.
Although there are no comparator studies that also address this issue using a model
with search frictions, our finding that steady-state unemployment is mainly driven by wage
determination and unemployment compensation is consistent with the emphasis on these factors
in the literature on the unemployment volatility puzzle. This literature has arisen following the
demonstration by Shimer (2005) that simulations of the standard search frictions model, without
effort effects, is unable to generate sufficient volatility of unemployment, vacancies and labour
market tightness to match the large values observed in the data. Proposed ”solutions” to this
challenge have used a variety of alternative formalisations of wage bargaining (eg Hall and
Milgrom, 2008) or alternative parameterisations (eg Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008) but have
not focussed on the matching function that generates labour market frictions.
We next consider a variety of changes to our parameterisation, to explore the robustness
of this conclusion. Rows 2) and 3) of Table 2) use σ = 0.03 and σ = 0.02; although these
5Shimer (2005) uses the slighly lower value of τ = 0.1
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ange the steady-state rate of unemployment, they do not change the dominance of involuntary
unemployment. Rows 4) and 5) use φ = 0.63 and φ = 0.43; here again there is no significant
change in the relative importance of involuntary unemployment. We next vary the mark-up,
considering µ = 1 and µ = 1.4; as rows 6) and 7) show, these changes affect the steady-state rate
of unemployment but not the rate of involuntary unemployment. There is no marked change
in the dominance of involuntary unemployment. Finally, rows 8) and 9) report results when
γ = 0.11 and γ = 0.35; here again there is no change in the rate of involuntary unemployment
and no change in the dominance of involuntary unemployment. These experiments suggest that
the result that most unemployment in steady-state is due to involuntary unemployment is quite
robust.
Table 2. Equilibrium Unemployment
change from Table 1) U Uew U f r λ
5.37% 4.72% 0.65% 0.121
σ = 0.03 6.18% 5.66% 0.52% 0.083
σ = 0.02 4.60% 3.77% 0.83% 0.180
φ = 0.63 4.76% 3.97% 0.79% 0.167
φ = 0.43 6.31% 5.81% 0.49% 0.078
µ = 1 5.27% 4.72% 0.56% 0.106
µ = 1.4 5.54% 4.72% 0.82% 0.148
γ = 0.11 5.15% 4.72% 0.44% 0.085
γ = 0.35 5.92% 4.72% 1.20% 0.203
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have combined a generic representation of efficiency wage effects with a search
and matching model in order to decompose steady-state unemployment into a component due
to involuntary unemployment and a component reflecting frictional unemployment. We have
also derived a simple generalisation of the Solow Condition, from which we used to express the
wage as the sum of efficiency wage and search-and-matching components. Calibrations of our
model suggest that over 85% of steady-state unemployment is involuntary.
We would argue that our results are interesting but not definitive. We would wish to
develop our work, in three main directions. First, more work is needed to establish the generality
of our findings. Second, we should investigate why the contribution of frictional unemployment
is so small. We suspect that this in part reflects the specific form for the effort function used
in this paper. Thirdly, our decomposition is only for the equilibrium rate of unemployment. A
natural extension of our work would analyse the decomposition of unemployment away from
steady-state. We hope to address these issues in further work.
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